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1   INTRODUCTION 
In July 2010 the United Nations Working Group on Use of Mercenaries as a Means of 
Violating and Impeding the Exercise of Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination (“the 
Working Group”)1 presented its Draft International Convention on the Regulation, 
Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies (“the Draft 
Convention”) to the 15th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva.2 A year 
before, the UN Commission on Human Rights had mandated the Working Group to 
consult with academic institutions, NGOs and other related bodies so as to establish 
the “content and scope of a possible draft convention on private companies offering 
military assistance, consultancy and other military security-related services on the 
                                               
1  The Working Group, composed of five independent experts, was established by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 2005 to monitor and conduct research on mercenaries and 
mercenary-related activities. It took over from the office of UN Special Rapporteur on the Use of 
Mercenaries that had been in existence since 1987, whose terms of reference had largely been 
overtaken by the changes in the global security landscape after the demise of the cold war. See Del 
Prado J “Private and security Companies and the UN Working Group and the Use of Mercenaries” 
(2009) 13 (3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 429. 
2  See the Draft of a possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) for 
consideration and action by the Human Rights Council, annexed to the Report of the UN Working 
Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating and Impeding the Exercise of Rights of 
Peoples to Self-Determination (A/HRC/15/25, 5 July 2010) available at http://www2. 
ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/docs/A.HRC.15.25.pdf (accessed 30 October 2010). 
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international market”.3 The Working Group was also directed to share with member 
states the “elements for a possible draft convention on private military and security 
companies, requesting their input on the content and scope of such a convention”. 
This mandate merely added impetus to an ongoing process that the Working Group 
had been engaged in since 2006, which had already yielded several drafts of a 
proposed law.4 The current proposal consolidates all these efforts and promises to 
establish a more effective regime for PMSC regulation. 
 Since preparing the first draft of a possible convention the Working Group 
members have been on the road, soliciting support for their initiative all over the 
world. So far they have been to Latin America, the Caribbean,5 Asia and the Pacific,6 
Africa7 and the Western European region.8 Whereas the Latin American, Asian and 
African countries have at least signified their support for some form of binding 
international framework for the regulation of PMSCs, Western nations, mainly the 
USA and the UK, have expressed serious doubts about the necessity of a multilateral 
regime of this kind. Their opposition can be broken down into five main arguments. 
Firstly it is contended that the existing international regulatory mechanisms for 
PMSCs are sufficient; what the world needs is implementation and not a new law. 
Further, it is said that the effectiveness of existing frameworks, such as the 
Montreux Document,9 or the recently signed International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Service Providers,10 has not been tested. Secondly, they assert the 
                                               
3  See UN Human Rights Council Resolution /10/11 of 2009, para 13. 
4  The earlier drafts had equally attracted reviews and comments. See, for example, Strydom H “The 
Overview of the UN Draft Convention on private Military and security Companies” (2009) African 
Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 121. 
5  A/HRC/7/7/Add.5. 
6  On 26 and 27 October in Bangkok. The countries represented at the meeting were Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Myanmar, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Samoa, Thailand, Vietnam and Yemen. Of these countries Afghanistan raised the greatest concern 
regarding the activities of PMSCs: see Report on Regional Consultation for Asia and Pacific on the 
Activities of Private Military and Security Companies: Regulation and Monitoring (26-27 October 
2009, UNGA, A/HRC/15/25/Add.4). 
7  Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the African Union 
Commission sent representatives.  
8  The fifth and last regional consultation with the Western European and Others Group on the 
regulation and monitoring of the activities of PMSCs was held in Geneva on 14 April 2010. It was 
attended by representatives from Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America, as well as the European Union: see A/HRC/15/25/Add.6. 
9  This document was produced by a joint effort of seventeen countries: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States of America. The PMSC 
industry and the NGO community were also represented. The text is available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/467 (accessed 23 May 2009). 
10  Available at http://www.dcaf.ch/privatisation-security/_index.cfm (accessed 12 November 
2010). The Code was signed in Geneva on 9 November 2010 by 58 companies. See Harwood M 
“ASIS members sign private security contractors code of conduct” available at 
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lack of agreement on what constitutes an “inherent” government function — i.e., 
that which could legally be excluded from privatisation. Thus, attempting to legislate 
on the issue effectively compromises the efforts to achieve standardisation of 
fundamental principles for the national regulation of the industry. Thirdly, the 
Working Group is said to have over-stepped its mandate by attempting to bring 
about legislation to deal with a purely human rights issue; the mandate of the 
Working Group is interpreted as being limited to investigating mercenary activity 
and assisting member states in eradicating the menace. Fourthly, it is argued that 
the licensing procedure suggested by the Draft Convention will be costly for some 
states; and, lastly, it is said that an international treaty such as the one envisaged 
needs broader consultations than had been carried out thus far. 
 The position adopted by Western nations may not have been totally unexpected, 
but the arguments they raised forecast some of the challenges that the Working 
Group is likely to face in its effort to garner support for the draft law. Although, from 
an ideological standpoint, factors that influence Western opposition to multilateral 
legal regimes are often subjective, there is no denying that treaty-making is all about 
achieving consensus on matters of transnational concern.11 This notwithstanding, it 
may be instructive to note that the wheels of normative change, at the international 
level at least, are no longer solely driven by the whims of the powerful states but by 
the combination of a wide variety of interests and activities bringing together 
governments, transnational entities and networks, civil society and the academic 
lobby from all parts of the world. This is what happened with treaties enacted in the 
last two decades, such as the Weapons Conventions and the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court,12 and is likely to be the case with the proposed PMSC 
Convention. The test, in my view, should be whether, over and above the subjective 
criteria upon which Western opposition to the law are based, there are fundamental 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/asis-members-sign-private-security-contractor-
code-conduct-007877 (accessed 22 November 2010). 
11  This assessment is particularly true of the US approach to multilateral human rights treaties. See 
Bradley C “Unratified treaties, Domestic Politics and the US Constitution” (2007) 48(2) Harvard 
International Law Journal 307; Devenmack R & M Hoffman “Just scraps of paper? Dynamics of 
multilateral treaty making” (2008) 43 (2) Cooperation and Conflict 185; Prins B & B. Marshall, 
“Senate influence or presidential unilateralism? An examination of treaties and executive 
agreements for Theodore Roosevelt and George Bush” (2008) 26 (2) Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 191. 
12  See, for example, Malanczuk P “The International Criminal Court and landmines: what are the 
consequences of leaving US behind?” (2000) 11(1) European Journal of International Law 77 
(Analysing the reasons and consequences of US not supporting the Ottawa and the ICC treaties); 
Kervers D “Strengthening Compliance with the Biological Weapons conventions: The protocol 
negotiations” (2002) 7(2) Journal of Conflict Security Law 275(discussing US refusal to support 
the Draft protocol). See also Michie A “The provisional application of arms control treaties” 
(2005) 10(3) Journal of Conflict Security Law 345; Georghiades K “The Ottawa Convention: 
meeting the challenges of anti-personnel mines” (1998) 14(3) International Relations 51; Van 
Woudenberg N “The long and winding road towards an instrument on cluster munitions” (2007) 
12(3) Journal of Conflict Security Law 447.  
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limitations to the Draft Convention that may render its mission impossible to 
achieve or its role merely cosmetic. 
 This article will not confront the arguments against the Draft Convention directly 
but, rather, will analyse in a holistic manner the proprietary promise of the law in 
light of the broad concerns that have led to the entrenchment of the PMSC issue in 
the normative agenda of the international community. It will begin by 
contextualising the draft law within the broader PMSC debate and summarising the 
essence of its regulatory regime. Three broad themes will then be elicited and 
analysed to provide insights on the viability of the draft law. These are: the overall 
question of state responsibility and how it affects enforcement of rules; the use of 
force and the concomitant notion of inherent state functions; and the oversight and 
monitoring mechanisms. The objective assessment of how the draft law covers these 
themes will reveal a consistent pattern of a shared responsibility between PMSCs 
themselves, the host states and the contracting states to create a more “acceptable” 
environment for PMSC operations. The article concludes that the draft law, 
burdened as it is with the ideology of privatisation and the free market, has not 
departed from the international template for oversight of private entities which 
often does no more than create weak and ineffective systems. Nonetheless, the 
article acknowledges that the draft law is still a worthwhile endeavour and one 
which has greater promise than all other frameworks so far established.   
 
2   DRAFT CONVENTION IN PERSPECTIVE 
The rise of neo-liberal thinking in the Western hemisphere in the latter half of the 
last century promoted ideas that were concomitant with privatisation and free 
trade.13 These ideas have facilitated the breakdown of the hegemonic state and the 
creation of powerful private commercial entities driven solely by the objective of 
making profit.14 When exported to Africa, the neo-liberal agenda created a host of 
problems. In the first place it has led to the “destruction, not only of prior 
institutional frameworks and powers (such as the supposed prior state sovereignty 
over political-economic affairs) but also of divisions of labour, social relations, 
welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life, attachments to the land, habits 
of the heart, ways of thought”.15 Secondly, and perhaps most crucially to the 
discussion here, it has promoted ruthless competition for natural resources; and 
                                               
13  Neo-liberalism is a theory in political science which justifies the expansion of markets and the 
promotion of competition and formalism as opposed to the protectionism of the state and other 
bureaucratic agencies. For discussion of the relationship between neo-liberalism and the state, 
see Lee S and McBride S “Introduction” in Lee S and McBride S (eds)  Neo-Liberalism, State Power 
and Global Governance in the Twenty First Century (2007) 1. 
14  See, generally, Chomsky N Profit and People: Neo-colonialism and Global Order (1999); Juma L 
“The war in Congo: Shadow networks and the failure of internationalism” (2006) 10(2) Gonzaga 
Journal of International Law 97. 
15  See Harvey D “Neo-Liberalism as Creative Destruction” (2007) 2 (4) Interfacehs available at 
http://www.interfacehs.sp.senac.br/images/artigos/79_pdf. (accessed 17 April, 2011). 
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this could be the reason why most regions in Africa with an abundant wealth of 
natural resources have become centres of political instability and endless armed 
conflicts.16 Paradoxically, instability anywhere in the world threatens legitimate 
commerce and diminishes the ability of the state to deliver on other tenets of the 
neo-liberalist programme. At the same time, combating insecurity in a neo-liberal 
environment must be balanced against other interests. This is because neo-
liberalism is not only about trade but also about individual freedoms and rights. 
Thus, improving global security must contend with limitations brought about by the 
need to protect human rights and ensure social justice. And that is how private 
security became a factor in global governance. The only way in which responsibility 
for human rights violations could be avoided while pursuing national security goals 
was by promoting the private security industry.17 But this aside, in the current 
world climate any military action taken in pursuit of national interests abroad 
would be increasingly unpopular if the magnitude of loss of life associated with such 
action was seen to be unwarranted. Moreover, the option to pursue such interests in 
a more cost-efficient manner has become extremely compelling, not only in 
monetary terms but also as a means of improving security governance.18 Thus 
PMSCs are no accident; they are a product of the privatisation and maximisation of 
profit ideology which drives processes to reorganise the security infrastructure as 
well as of the concomitant growth of political awareness that inform political 
choices in the developed world.  
 Unfortunately, the tension between the free market and the demands of human 
rights has placed the security debate in the context of war and conflict in Africa in a 
rather precarious situation. While the neo-liberal order has exposed the 
vulnerability of the African state, the choice between taking advantage of the free 
market and its band of private operators, and sticking with their national armies to 
                                               
16  See, for example, Kurtz M “The social foundations of institutional order: Reconsidering war and 
resource in third world state building” (2009) 37 (4) Politics & Society 479; Ross M “What do we 
know about natural resource and civil war?” (2004) 41 (3) Journal of Peace Research 337; Jensen 
N & L Wantchekon “Resource Wealth and political regimes in Africa” (2004)37(7) Comparative 
Political Studies 816; Lujala P et al “Diamond a curse? Civil war and a ‘lootable’ resource” (2005) 
49 (4) Journal of Conflict Resolution 538.  
17  This is because poor performances by PMSCs on the human rights score were less likely to 
damage the reputation of governments than if the same violations were committed by national 
armies. This was the case when the US hired MPRI to provide assistance to the Croat forces’ 
advance against Serb positions, which resulted in charges of war crimes against Croat 
commanders. The US was never blamed for assisting in the violations of international law. See 
Michaels J “Beyond accountability: The constitutional democratic and strategic problem with 
privatising war” (2004) 82 Washington University Law Quarterly 1001. 
18   See Avant D The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatising Security (2005) 30, who argues 
that through proxies states can influence conditions abroad without committing their troops. See 
also Singer P “Outsourcing War” (2005) 84 Foreign Affairs 119, 125; Cokayane J “Make or buy? 
Principal-Agent Theory and the regulation of private military companies” in Chesterman S & 
Lehnardt C (eds.) From Mercenaries to Market (2007) 196-216; Hawkins D et al “Delegation under 
anarchy: States, international organisations and principal-agent theory” in Hawkins D et al (eds) 
Delegation and Agency in International Organisations (2006) 3-38, 7. 
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defend constitutional standards, is still a delicate one. All through the continent, we 
see a mix of approaches as weak and illegitimate governments struggle to find a 
balance.19 The common denominator, so far, is hatred of mercenaries, which is 
boldly articulated in the African Union Mercenary Convention20 and reinforced by 
the UN Mercenary Convention.21 But, beyond mercenaries, there is no effective 
debate on the private security industry and how it affects regional and international 
peace. Yet the numbers of PMSCs operating in the continent are growing and their 
work spreading across many sectors — some are employed by relatively peaceful 
states to train their armies, others contracted to assist with peace-building and 
reconstruction efforts, while a significant number are involved in areas of active 
armed conflict such as in Darfur and Somalia.   
 Privatisation of security all around the world has come at a heavy price. PMSCs 
have been accused of disregarding rules of international humanitarian and human 
rights law in all places where they work. Incidences of unlawful killings, cases of 
human trafficking, illegal labour practices and several other transgressions by PMSC 
operatives have been well documented.22 The hue and cry against PMSCs has 
heightened the need for an effective regulatory framework for their operations. The 
response has been varied: from self-regulatory schemes by PMSC associations to 
non-binding instruments by regional organisations and blocs of states. What has 
been missing is a binding international framework that prescribes standards for 
private security operators and places responsibility on governments to account for 
the activities of PMSCs working within their jurisdictions.    
 
2.1   The Purpose of the Draft Convention 
During consultations that preceded the preparation of the Draft Convention, various 
constituencies expressed the need for an overarching and binding international 
framework for the regulation of PMSC activities.23 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the Convention outlines its main objective as the need to fill the “important gaps … 
in national and international legal regimes applicable to private military and 
                                               
19  See generally, Musah A & Kayode J Mercenarism: An African Security Dilemma (2000). 
20  The Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa OAU Doc CM/433/Rev. L. 
Annex1 (1972) adopted in Libreville on 3 July 1977 and entering into force on 22 April 1985. 
21 See the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, A/RES/44/34, entered into force on 20 October 2001. 
22  See, for example, Zarate J “The Emergence of the New Dog of War: Private International Security 
Companies, International Law and the New World Order” (1998) 34 Stanford Journal of 
International Law, 34; Amann D “Abu Ghraib” (2005) 153(6) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 2085; Chesterman S “Leashing the Dogs of War” (2005) 5(1) Carnegie Reporter 37. 
23 See, for example, “Expert Group on Mercenaries Concludes Visit to Afghanistan”, available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-7QWSR7?OpenDocument (accessed 25 
October 2010). See also the remarks by Samira Safarova, the representative of Azerbaijan, and 
Octavio Augusto, representative of Brazil, during the 15th Session of the Human Rights Council 
Meeting in Geneva (fn 2 above). 
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security companies”.24 Apart from this objective, the Convention articulates several 
other responses to the PMSC problem that are essential to the regulatory regime it 
seeks to establish. Key among these are creating a regulatory framework that would 
ensure that PMSCs observe international humanitarian and human rights law; 
providing a framework for regulating not only the conduct of private military and 
security companies but also their relationship with member states of the UN by 
establishing the range of functions that may not be undertaken by such companies; 
harmonising the full breadth of international instruments that have a bearing on 
PMSCs; and setting agreeable legal standards for regulation of PMSCs.25  
 The Draft Convention may be an instrument of multifaceted tasks, but its 
legitimacy still rests on the acknowledgement that a universally conceived 
framework with political support of nation states has a better promise of reining in 
PMSCs than self-regulatory frameworks. But the question which is relevant to the 
discussion here is whether the objectives of the draft law as outlined in article 1 
could be achieved other than through a multilateral treaty.26 In other words, is the 
need for a binding treaty based on an objective assessment of the threat that PMSCs 
pose? Moreover, given the rather uncertain terrain of the international treaty-
making process,27 can the draft law be rationalised on the basis that it guarantees 
the attainment of relative or absolute gains as far as the containment of PMSCs is 
concerned?  
 There are no obvious answers to these questions. Usually, treaties may be 
enacted to curb a phenomenon that constitutes a global threat. The treaty could 
then be seen as an expression of political commitment to deal with the problem. 
From a social constructivist perspective, a multilateral treaty could be the means of 
galvanising cooperation among states towards ensuring that unacceptable 
behaviour occurring in the international space is eradicated. No wonder 
“contractual international law and multilateralism have become the dominant 
institutional practices governing modern international society”.28 The Draft 
Convention somewhat fits within this paradigm. This is discernable, first of all, from 
the reports of the Working Group on its interaction with the various constituencies, 
during the preparatory stages of the Draft Convention. The reports reveal a 
consistent demand by various country representatives for a multilateral regime to 
curb PMSC behaviour.29 Secondly, provisions of the draft law itself indicate a higher 
purpose that can only be achieved through multilateralism. For example, its attempt 
                                               
24  Preamble, para 21. 
25  See Preamble, para 2, 7, 11and 23. The objectives are further distilled in art 1. 
26  In international parlance, the role of treaties is often a contested one. For example, Mersheimer 
argues that the whole idea of cooperative multilateral interaction is a chimera. See Mersheimer J 
“The false promise of international institutions” (1994/5) 19 International Security 5. 
27  Denemark R & Hoffman M “Just Scraps of paper? The dynamics of multilateral treaty making” 
(2008) 43 (2) Cooperation & Conflict 185. 
28 Reus-Smit C “The constitutional structure of the international society and the nature of 
fundamental institutions” (1997) International Organizations 555 at 558. 
29  See, for example, the Afghanistan report (fn 23 above). 
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to define “inherent functions of the state”, which none of the other instruments has 
done, may be limited but nonetheless useful in demarcating zones in which 
privatisation may be excluded. Also, the rather pervasive affirmation of the role of 
international law, human rights and international humanitarian law is crucial to the 
processes aimed at achieving the effective regulation of PMSCs. In this way the draft 
law and its institutions add to the already existing enforcement mechanisms for 
human rights and of international humanitarian law. The anticipation is that it will 
take advantage of the experiences of the institutions created under these regimes to 
establish a more robust international monitoring and oversight regime for PMSCs – 
more than could ever be expected of self-regulatory and non-binding mechanisms.  
 
2.2   Overcoming the definitional conundrum 
Before PMSCs acquired the legitimacy that they enjoy today, they were defined 
relative to their difference with outlawed mercenaries.30 Although both provided 
military and security services for profit, significant differences in their modus 
operandi were noted.31 While mercenaries were bands of rogue soldiers roaming the 
African continent and overthrowing governments, PMSCs were well-organised 
business entities whose services were offered in legitimate circumstances. And 
while PMSCs were totally outside the radar of domestic and international legal 
regimes, mercenaries were banned by a host of regional and international 
instruments.32 But these differences have not in the least helped to define what 
PMSCs are for purposes of placing them under an international regulatory regime.  
 The general understanding is that PMSCs are corporations that offer military or 
security-related services for monetary gain.33 Recent attempts at defining PMSCs 
have laid emphasis on their functional attributes. For example, according to the 
Montreux Document, PMSCs are “private business entities that provide military 
and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves”.34 The 
document then describes the kinds of activities that such entities may be involved 
                                               
30  Earlier works on mercenaries used various methods to make the distinction. Singer’s “end of 
spear” metaphor is a good example. See Singer P Corporate Warriors: The Rise of Privatized 
Military Industry (2003). See also Zarate (fn 22 above).   
31  Messner J “Working towards effective legislative and regulatory solutions for private security 
industry in Africa” in Gumedze S (ed) Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa: A Need for a New 
Continental Approach (2008) 145. 
32  See Cowling M “Outsourcing and Military: Implications for international humanitarian law” 
(2007) 32 South African Yearbook of International Law 313.  
33  Gillard defines them as “corporations that perform functions traditionally performed by security 
or military apparatuses of the state”: see Gillard E “Business goes to war: Private military/security 
companies and international humanitarian law” (2006) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 
525, 526. 
34  Montreux Document, para 9. Military and security services are further defined to include “armed 
guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; 
maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of 
local forces and security personnel”. 
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in. It is apparent from this definition that the status of PMSCs should be discernable 
from what they do — a functional approach that deviates from the often-used 
classification based on their proximity to or involvement in combat operations.35 It 
further defines PMSC personnel as “persons employed by, through direct hire or 
under a contract with, a PMSC, including its employees and managers”. Obviously, 
this narrows down the category of persons that may incur responsibility on behalf 
of the PMSC and recognises the element of “subcontracting” that is prevalent in the 
private security industry.36 What is striking about this definition is that it avoids 
engagement with what has become the most contentious issue of PMSCs operations 
in conflict zones — their involvement in actual combat. Although it recognises that 
PMSC personnel may be “incorporated into regular armed forces of a state”, or that 
their personnel may qualify as “persons accompanying the armed forces” in terms of 
article 4A (4) of the Third Geneva Convention,37 the document creates the 
impression that entities involved in combat operations, other than within the 
narrow limits of paragraph 26, do not come under its ambit. At the same time the 
document leaves it to the discretion of states to determine the kinds of services that 
may be contracted out, but cautions them to take into account the question whether 
such services “could cause PMSCs personnel to become involved in direct 
participation in hostilities”.38 
 The Draft Convention does not significantly deviate from the Montreux 
Document. It defines a PMSC as a “corporate entity which provides on a 
compensatory basis military and or security services including investigation 
services, by physical and or legal entities”.39 Military services are further defined to 
include “specialised services related to military actions” such as strategic planning, 
intelligence, investigation, land, sea or air reconnaissance, flight operations of any 
type, manned or unmanned, satellite surveillance, military training and logistics, 
material and technical support to armed forces, and other related activities. Security 
services, on the other hand, are defined to include armed guarding or protection of 
buildings, installations, property and people, police training, material and technical 
support to police forces, elaboration and implementation of informational security 
measures and other related activities.40  
                                               
35  Cockayne J “Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, 
Weakness and Promise of the Montreux Document” (2009) 13(3) Journal of Conflict & Security 
Law 401, 406. 
36  Para 31 of the document deals with subcontracting and places obligations on principals to ensure 
that notification is made to the state; they demonstrate that subcontractors have authorisation; 
and that the principal is liable for the conduct of the subcontractor.  
37  See para 26(b) and (c). An elaborate discussion of art 4A of the Third Geneva Convention can be 
found in Fleck D et al, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2000) 95. 
38  See Part II para 1. 
39  Art 2. 
40  Art 2(c). 
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 Although, like the Montreux document, the Draft Convention adopts a functional 
definitional approach, it thus makes a distinction between “military” and “security” 
services, presumably to canvass a wider understanding of the roles that PMSCs play 
in modern military operations. However, the definition does not include combat 
operations, and perhaps this is in tandem with articles 8 and 9 which prohibit 
involvement of PMSCs in governmental functions (defined to include direct 
participation in hostilities) and outlaws the use of force. Nonetheless, the definition 
is open-ended with the possibility that states can determine the ranges of activities 
that may be outsourced.  
 The Draft Convention avoids the use of the word “mercenary” in its text. The only 
miniature reference is in the Preamble where the UN and the OAU Conventions on 
mercenaries are mentioned. This was probably a compromise after PMSC 
organisations vehemently criticised the earlier draft that had expressly called for 
ratification of the anti-mercenary instruments as measures towards regulating 
PMSC activity. Nonetheless, some authors have called for an express prohibition of 
mercenarism in the Convention so as to separate PMSCs that carry out legitimate 
activities from the shadowy ones that harbour mercenaries and engage in 
mercenary activities.41 But this is unlikely to happen, given current trends. The 
question is whether it is desirable to proceed as though all mercenaries have been 
eliminated and their sins completely purged.  
 
3   THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
The challenges to regulating activities of PMSCs arise from their transient character, 
which makes it difficult to subject their operations to an effective oversight regime. 
Most PMSCs are hybrid in nature, and their status, even operations, traverse the 
worlds of business, of the military and of humanitarianism. This makes it difficult to 
assign them to a single regulatory regime. The problem is compounded by the fact 
that PMSC activities blossom in conditions of armed conflict, where governmental 
authority is heavily contested or non-existent. In the African context, the problem is 
exacerbated by ineffective domestic legal systems and widespread complicity of 
governments in the illegal activities of PMSCs.42 Thus, PMSC operators are rarely 
brought to court within jurisdictions where they work. This has been particularly 
true of Iraq, Afghanistan, DRC and Sudan.43 Further, although governments are the 
                                               
41  See, for example, Gumedze S “Addressing the use of private security and military companies at the 
international level” ISS Paper 201 (November 2009) available at http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/ 
dspace/bitstream/10625/41432/1/129208.pdf (accessed 12 June 2010). 
42  The often-cited example is that of President Ahmed Tejan Kabba of Sierra Leone who engaged the 
services of Executive Outcomes, a South African mercenary outfit, to repel RUF assault on 
Monrovia during the civil war. See Francis D “Mercenary intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing 
national security or international exploitation” (1999) 20 Third World Quarterly 319.  
43  In Iraq the US transitional authority granted immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law to all 
PMSC operators. See Order 17 of the US Coalition Provisional Authority, signed in December 
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main clients of PMSCs, they have persistently denied accountability for the 
misconduct of PMSCs, not to mention the demonstrable ambivalence towards 
preventing or enforcing international standards against these entities.44 Therefore it 
makes practical sense to expand the responsibility of states in this regard. The idea 
seems to be that, since the locus of PMSC activity is within the jurisdiction of states, 
and states are the subjects of international law, the rules of state responsibility 
should derivatively impact upon PMSCs. 
 
3.1 The international law of state responsibility 
Under international law, state responsibility indicates the consequences of a breach 
of international obligations by states and enunciates the ranges of acceptable 
responses to such breaches.45 This principle is well grounded in international law 
and has been affirmed by international courts and tribunals.46 The responsibility 
rests on states because they are the primary subjects of international law. The 
international law rules on state responsibility are currently derived from the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft 
Articles”) developed by the International Law Commission and adopted in 2001.47 
 Under the Draft Articles an act will be wrongful if it is “attributable” to a state 
under international law and constitutes a breach of the international obligations of 
the state. Ordinarily government officials will have both inherent and sometimes 
ostensible authority to bind the state. Thus, any wrongful act that they commit will 
be attributable to the state.48 What presents some difficulty is how to determine 
“attribution” where an activity is carried out by an entity which is not part of the 
government. This is particularly problematic in cases of PMSCs that operate in 
conflict zones. Under article 4 of the ILC rules the act of an entity may be attributed 
to a state if the entity is acting as a state organ. It is therefore apparent that where a 
                                                                                                                                            
2006. Several cases arising out of the conduct of PMSCs in Iraq have been tried in the US; for 
example, US v Pissaro, No 5:04-CR-211-1(E.DNC. June 17, 2004). See also Stinnet N “Regulating 
the privatization of war: How to stop private military from committing human rights abuses” 
(2005) Boston College International & Comparative law Review 211. 
44  Gaston E “Mercenaries 2.0? The rise of the modern private security industry and its implications 
for international law enforcement” (2008) 49 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 221. 
45  Art 1 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that “Every internationally wrongful act of a state entails 
the international responsibility of that state”. 
46  See, for example, Chorzow Factory (1927) PCIJ ser. A no. 9; Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Reports (1949) 
23. In Chorzow the court defined state responsibility as a principle of international law involving 
an “obligation to make reparation for any breach of an engagement”. 
47  These rules are generally considered to have acquired the status of customary international law. 
See Wolfrun R “State responsibility for private actors: An old problem of renewed relevance” in 
Ragazzi M (ed) International Responsibility Today (Brill 2005) 424; Kiss A “State responsibility 
and liability for nuclear damage” (2005) 35 (1) Denver J. Int’l. L. & Pol. 67, 77. 
48  For example, enforced disappearance such as in Velasquez Rodriguez n Honduras, Merits , Inter-
AmCtHR, Ser C, No $ (1989); 95 ILR 259 para 183. 
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PMSC acts as an organ of state, and not as an independent contractor, state 
responsibility will be incurred.49 In this regard the source of authority could be 
founded on some legislation or decree, and the conduct would exhibit some colour 
of national authority. This is the case where, for example, PMSC personnel are 
incorporated in the state military or their activities are subordinated to government. 
However, subordination is not always easy to prove because most PMSCs are 
contracted as independent entities carrying out professional services. The 
determination as to whether PMSC personnel operating in any theatre of conflict 
have been incorporated into the state military must depend on the command and 
internal discipline tests provided for in article 43 of the First Additional Protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions. Rarely do PMSCs get incorporated into state armies; thus 
the probability of states incurring responsibility in terms of article 5 is minimal.      
 PMSC actions may also be attributed to the state where they are exercising 
governmental authority.50 In Case Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of 
Congo (DRC v Uganda)51 Uganda had advanced the argument that its soldiers (UPDF) 
were not acting in the capacity of persons exercising governmental authority while 
in the territory of the DRC. This argument was dismissed as the court found that the 
conduct of individual soldiers and officers of the UPDF were the conduct of a state 
organ. Thus, authority may be explicit from the nature of activity that a PMSC is 
required to perform. In most cases however, it is very difficult to find a nexus 
between activities of PMSCs and express governmental authority. A combination of 
factors must then be considered. For example, it may be necessary to examine how 
the power was conferred, the purpose for which the power was conferred and the 
extent to which the PMSC is accountable to the government. Indeed, if the power 
being exercised by the PMSC does not further any sovereign objective of the state, it 
may not be attributable to the state.  
 Commentators have suggested that the nature of the activity is crucial because 
some are more attributable to the state than others.52 If PMSCs are engaged in 
policing, or detention pursuant to judicial sentence then the authority may be 
explicit. Similarly, if they conduct interrogations, this may be attributable to the 
                                               
49  See art 4 of ILC. In the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosnian and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), the ICJ 
found that, although Serbia was not responsible for the Srebrenica genocide, it was still in breach 
of the Convention for failure to prevent the genocide and for not punishing the perpetrators. In 
the Court’s view the determination as to whether the action were attributable to the respondents 
depended on whether the acts were committed by organs of respondents or whether the agents 
were acting on the “instrument of or under the direct control of the respondent”. It found that the 
entities or persons who carried out the massacre were not completely dependent on federal 
authorities in Belgrade, nor were they acting under Belgrade’s instructions. For in-depth 
discussion of the decision see Dimitrijevic V & M Milanovic “The strange story of the Bosnian 
Genocide case” (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 65.  
50  Art 5. 
51  CJ Reports (2005), 168. 
52  See, for example, Hoppe C, “Passing the buck: State responsibility for private military companies” 
(2008) 19 (5) European Journal of International Law 991. 
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state more than just guarding installations. But the question of authority in 
international law also hinges on the level of control that the government has on the 
PMSC. In Nicaragua, for example, the ICJ observed that conduct may give rise to 
legal responsibility if it is proved that the state had “effective control” of the 
operations that resulted in the alleged violations of international law.53 The United 
States government had assisted in financing and training the contras and also 
participated in the planning and supervision of their military operations. Despite US 
involvement, the acts of the contras were not “attributable” to the US, thus could not 
give rise to legal responsibility on its part.54 The Court argued that, for the conduct 
of the contras to give rise to such responsibility, “it would in principle have to be 
proved that the state had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations 
in the course of which the alleged violations were committed”.55 More recently the 
“effective control” test was affirmed by the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide case.56 
 The other limb to the attribution test is provided for in article 8 of the draft 
Convention. Here, attribution may occur when PMSCs are directed or controlled by 
the state. This is only possible if the wrongful act committed by a PMSC is the result 
of a direct order by the state or was performed under the direct control of 
government. However, if for any reason the act was beyond the scope of authority 
conferred on the PMSC, the state will be excused from liability. This rule (ultra vires) 
has obviously come under heavy criticism from scholars.57 The suggestion put forth 
is that, if there is “apparent authority”, states should not be shielded from 
responsibility. Still, the PMSC activity under scrutiny must have a cognisable nexus 
with the authority conferred, and this is never easy to prove in conflict situations 
where even the status of government is contested. 
      
3.2  Topology of state responsibility under the Draft Convention  
The Draft Convention creates a framework through which state responsibility can 
be incurred in respect of certain acts of PMSCs, without necessarily satisfying the 
                                               
53  Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, Merits judgment (Nicaragua v USA) 
ICJ Reports 1986, p 14 para 115.  
54  Note, however, that the court still found the United States responsible for its own conduct — that 
of training and financing the contras and carrying out specific operations, including the mining of 
the Nicaraguan harbour — which the court classified as wrongful conduct: ibid, paras 75-80, 238, 
242.  
55  Ibid para 115. 
56  Compare the “effective control” test with the “overall control” test in the ICTY case of Prosecutor v 
Tadić (Case No IT-94-1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber). According to the ICTY, “overall 
control” is achieved when the state “has a role in organising, coordinating and planning the 
military action of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing 
operational support to that group” Para 137. See Casese A “The Nicaragua and Tadić tests 
revisited in light of the ICJ judgment on Genocide in Bosnia” (2007) 18(4) European Journal of 
International Law 649; Vité S “Typology of Armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: 
Legal concepts and actual limitations” (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 69. 
57  See for example, Browlie I Principles of Public International Law 7ed. (2008) 452. 
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traditional rules of international law discussed above. This is a useful innovation, 
and it is what sets the Draft Convention apart from other treaty regimes. But, before 
examining how individual activities of PMSCs are treated in the Draft Convention, 
certain general rules of responsibility need to be clarified. First, the Convention 
categorises states into four kinds (contracting states, states of operation, home 
states and third states) and assigns responsibility accordingly.58 But irrespective of 
the division, states will still bear responsibility “for military and security activities of 
PMSCs registered or operating in their jurisdiction, whether or not these entities are 
contracted by the state”.59  
 Thus it will no longer be necessary to prove “attribution” or “subordination”, as is 
the case under the general rules of international law, to hold a state responsible for 
the activity of PMSCs. This provision has profound implication for states and PMSCs 
alike. Take for example the controversy around AEGIS Defence Services Ltd, a 
British company that secretly relocated its offices to Basel, Switzerland, in October 
2010.60 Its owner, Tim Spencer, was the man behind the infamous Sandline 
operations in Sierra Leone at the height of the civil war in that country. In the recent 
past Tim Spencer has reinvented himself and his company has been able to attract 
contracts from the US government for services in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
company is also known to be extending its network to Africa, perhaps in less 
controversial circumstances than the past. However, for purposes of our analysis, if 
Switzerland were a state party to the Draft Convention it would have to license and 
register the company under its domestic regime and also bear responsibility for the 
military and security activity of AEGIS all over the world. In fact, victims of 
violations perpetrated by AEGIS personnel working in Africa would no doubt be 
quite happy to bring their claims against Switzerland rather than their own 
governments. They would also be able to shop for a convenient forum to bring such 
a suit. This in itself may act as major deterrent to allowing rogue PMSCs to operate 
within the territory of a state.  
 Secondly, the Draft Convention distinguishes between “inherent” state functions, 
which cannot be delegated and for which the state takes direct responsibility, and 
those functions that are not such and can thus be delegated, therefore giving rise to 
functional international responsibility on the part of PMSCs.61 This is to ensure that 
states preserve their sovereignty and do not abdicate their responsibility towards 
their citizens and other states. That is perhaps the reason why article 9 expressly 
prohibits the delegation or outsourcing of such functions. Related to this is a 
                                               
58  Art 2 (j-m). It should be noted however, that most aspects of responsibility under the Draft 
Convention overlap, and so states may generally bear liability despite this categorisation. 
59  Art 4(1). 
60  The relocation sparked off riots in the city of Basel: see Smith R “British Mercenary not welcome 
in Switzerland” Linksunten.Indymedia.org available at http://linksunten.indymedia. org/de 
/node/26589  accessed 1 November 2010); Dacey J “Swiss fired up over arrival of mercenary 
firm” (Swiss.info.ch) available at http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/Swiss_fired_up_over_ 
arrival_of_mercenary_firm.html?cid=22482084 (accessed 1 November 2010). 
61  Art 2. 
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requirement for states to ensure that PMSCs act in accordance with international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law. Apart from the general duty 
to take legislative and other measures to establish and uphold the rule of law,62 
states are specifically enjoined to ensure that contracts or agreements that they 
enter into with PMSCs do not frustrate this goal, and that the personnel of PMSCs 
respect the law.63  
 Thirdly, the draft law extends responsibility to intergovernmental organisations 
(INGO).64  This is realistic because these organisations use PMSCs in various aspects 
of their work.65 In Africa PMSCs are assisting in peacekeeping operations, 
humanitarian assistance and increasingly, in peace-building and reconstruction 
efforts.66 In Sierra Leone, for example, PMSCs are an integral part of its security 
sector reform programme. Unlike in the past, the UN and AU are now engaging the 
services of PMSCs on a regular basis and may be complicit, just like states, in 
perpetuating the relative impunity of PMSC operatives.67 The Draft Convention’s 
approach is thus welcome and should be supported.  
 
3.2.1 Responsibility with regard to the use of force 
The prohibition on the use of force by PMSCs is contained in article 8 of the Draft 
Convention. States are required to take measures to prohibit PMSCs from engaging 
in direct hostilities or other acts that may result in overthrowing governments, 
changing internationally recognised borders, violating the sovereignty of states or 
any part thereof and explicitly targeting civilians. The term “direct participation” is 
not defined by the Convention. What exactly should direct participation entail? Can 
a PMSC that provides food to soldiers or toilets in combat zones be directly 
participating in the conflict? Or should direct participation be limited to the actual 
firing of weapons?  
Although a precise definition of the term is hard to find, guidance can be obtained 
from practices in international humanitarian law (“IHL”). Under IHL civilians in a 
situation of conflict should not be targeted “unless and for such time as they directly 
                                               
62  Art 5. 
63  Art 7 and 17. 
64  Art 3. 
65  See generally, Cokayane J Commercial Security in the Humanitarian Space: Blurring Boundaries or 
Building States (2006). 
66  See Spearin C “Private security companies and humanitarians: A corporate solution to securing 
humanitarian space” (2001) 8 (1) International Peacekeeping 24. 
67  For example, in Darfur the AU, with the assistance of the US Department of State, hired Pacific 
Architectural Engineers to assist with logistical support, including construction of camps, 
provision of water and food and laundry services. See Appiah-Mensah S “AU’s critical assignment 
in Darfur: Challenges and constraints” (2005) 14 (2) Africa Security Review. See also the essays in 
Baker D & M Caporini (eds) Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics and Civil Military 
Relations (2008); Lynch C “UN Embraces Private Military and Security Companies” at 
http://w/2010/01/17/u embraces_private_military_contractors (accessed 28 October 2010). 
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participate in hostilities”.68 The notion of “direct participation” is also derived from 
the phrase “taking no active part in hostilities” found in article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions. The original use of the term in IHL parlance placed much 
emphasis on the causal link between the act complained of and the resultant harm.69 
In this way an individual working in an ammunition factory would not be directly 
participating in the conflict but his counterpart preparing ammunition for use in a 
warfront would. Likewise a party providing strategic intelligence analysis may not 
be, but one providing tactical intelligence to combat forces would.70 The test falls 
short if civilian activities fulfil critical aspects of the military endeavour, such as the 
provision of food or toilets, but appear to be far removed from actual combat 
operations. In a recent study the ICRC has developed a more nuanced interpretation 
of the term that goes beyond the causal link test.71 The study suggests that direct 
participation should refer not to the function, status or affiliation of a party, but to 
their engagement in a specific act during the conflict. The act should be one that is 
likely to affect military operations or cause death or injury to persons, or 
destruction to a certain degree (“threshold of harm”). Further, there must be a 
causal link between the act and the harm that results from it. Also, there must be a 
belligerent nexus between the act and the manner in which military operations are 
conducted, which means that the act should be specifically designed to cause harm 
in support of one party against the other.72 According to this rubric, individual acts 
of PMSC personnel will be crucial to the determination of the nexus (belligerent) as 
opposed to the general obligations under the contract. 
 It should also be noted that, whereas the Convention claims that its objective is to 
identify activities that are “inherently” governmental and therefore cannot be 
outsourced, its prerogative seems geared towards limiting PMSC involvement in 
direct hostilities. What it does is to define “inherent” functions as those consistent 
with the principle of state monopoly on the use of force, such as “direct participation 
in hostilities, waging war and or combat operations, taking prisoners, law making 
…and other functions that a state party consider to be inherently state functions”.73 
Gumedze argues rather convincingly that fundamental state functions are more than 
                                               
68  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Additional Protocol I) art 51(3), 1125 UNTS 3; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions  of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed conflict (Additional Protocol II) art 13(3), 1125 UNTS 609. 
69  See, for example, Schmidt M “Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict” 
in H. Fischer et al (eds) Festschrift Für Dieter Fleck (2004) 505 at www.michaelschmidt. 
org/images/directparticipationproofs.pdf (accessed 26 October 2010); Kretzmer D “Civilian 
Immunity: legal Aspects” in Promoratz I (ed) Civilian Immunity in War (2007) 91. 
70  Schmidt M “Deconstructing direct participation in hostilities: The constitutive elements” (2010) 
42 International Law & Politics 509. 
71  See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (prepared by N Melzer) (2009). 
See also Schmidt M (fn 69 above) 697. 
72  Schmidt Ibid.  
73  Art 2. 
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those consistent with its monopoly on the use of force.74 The Convention does not 
provide a useful grid for determining when functions that are otherwise permissible 
can slide into the prohibited zone. Moreover, the scope of some of the functions 
listed is not provided, so one is left to wonder why functions such as intelligence-
gathering or knowledge transfer within the military should be inherently 
governmental. It is apparent that what amounts to an “inherently state function” 
might still need to be rethought. 
 It is important to note that, as far as PMSCs are concerned, direct participation in 
armed conflict may result in breach of the Geneva Conventions, which may render 
their personnel liable to armed attack as legitimate targets. They may also lose their 
civilian protection under IHL.75 In addition, civilians in this situation lack 
“combatant privilege” and may be punished.76 
 
3.2.2  Criminal responsibility 
Can states commit crimes under international law? This has been a very 
controversial issue in international law circles.77 If a state uses a PMSC to commit 
acts of aggression or genocide against another state, would the innocent state be 
able to institute criminal proceedings in an international tribunal? To begin with, 
the law of state responsibility does not really differentiate between “criminal” and 
“civil” responsibility. Crawford and Olleson rightly observe that this branch of the 
law “does not embody classifications” as we may find in domestic systems.78 But that 
notwithstanding, international law is much clearer on individual criminal 
responsibility.79 Persons acting on behalf of a state may incur individual criminal 
liability if their actions fall within the categories of crimes specified under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and also amount to grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol II. Indeed, article 58 of the 
ILC Articles creates the possibility of finding “individual responsibility under 
international law of any person acting on behalf of a state”. 
                                               
74  Gumedze S (fn 41 above). 
75  Art 13(3) of Protocol II denies civilians the “general protection against the dangers arising from 
military operations”.  
76  See, for example, the case of David Hicks (United States v Hicks), an Australian detainee at 
Guantanamo Bay who was tried for attempted murder of members of coalition forces in 
Afghanistan. He was classified in the charge, rather dubiously, as an “unprivileged belligerent”.   
77  See, for example, Abi-Saab G “The Uses of Article 19” (1999) 10 European Journal of International 
Law 339; De Hoogh A Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes (1996); Jørgensen N The 
Responsibility of States for International Crimes (2000); Pellet A “A New Draft Articles of the 
International Law Commission...A Requiem for States’ Crime” (2001) 32 Netherlands YBIL 55. 
78  See Crawford J & S Olleson “The Nature and forms of international responsibility” in M. Evans (ed) 
International Law 2ed (2006) 458. 
79  See, for example, Lehnardt C “Individual liability of private military personnel under international 
criminal law” (2008) 19 (5) European Journal of International Law 1051. 
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 The Draft Convention requires state parties to establish jurisdiction over criminal 
conduct by PMSCs80 and take measures necessary for investigation, prosecution and 
punishment of violations of the draft Convention.81 It also endorses individual 
criminal responsibility for superiors of PMSC personnel.82 In the past PMSC 
personnel have acted with impunity because no state was ready to assume the 
responsibility of punishing their transgressions. The Draft Convention seeks to 
remedy this by creating a multiple system of jurisdictional authority over PMSC 
conduct. In the framework created by the Draft Convention, a single criminal act 
could be tried by several countries. States are thereby enjoined to establish 
jurisdiction over offences committed within their territory, aboard a vessel flying 
the flag of the state or an aircraft registered in the state or committed by their 
nationals. The requirement goes further to allow for the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
state when a national is a victim or the offence is committed by a person who 
habitually resides in its territory.83 States may also choose whether to extradite a 
person to a state which has established jurisdiction or to try such person itself, if the 
person is present within its jurisdiction.84 The Draft Convention envisages that 
states would generally exercise jurisdiction not only where the offence is committed 
within their territory but also when the offender is their national, irrespective of 
where the offence could have been committed. The other option open to states is 
that of extradition.85 Article 24 makes all offences under the Draft convention 
extraditable, but this may be subject to any bilateral arrangements or domestic law. 
However, the Convention invites state parties to modify bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements to conform to this article.  
 
3.2.3  Protection of Victims 
The Draft convention establishes responsibility for states to ensure that restitution 
or compensation is provided for persons who suffer as a result of PMSC violation of 
the law.86 It also calls for the establishment of an international fund for the 
rehabilitation of victims.87 It suggests that such a fund be created under the auspices 
of the UN and administered by the Secretary General. The fund would provide 
reparation to victims of offences under the convention and assist in their 
rehabilitation. The idea of compensation for victims of corporate activities has never 
been adequately addressed by international law. However, there are indications that 
                                               
80  Art 21. 
81  Art 23. 
82  See art 7(3). But the personnel must be under their “effective authority and control”. See also 
Frulli M “Exploring command responsibility of private military contractors” (2010) Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law 1. 
83  Art 21(2).  
84  Art 22(4). 
85  See art 24. 
86   Art 20 (4). 
87  See art 28. 
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international criminal tribunals may be open to considering the issue of 
compensation for victims. For example, the ICTY rules of procedure provide that the 
trial chamber may consider claims for reparation and restitution of property after 
judgment and conviction.88  It also provides that judgments of the tribunal will be 
binding on any national or international courts that are considering claims of 
compensation by victims. A thinly-veiled recognition of the duty to compensate 
victims by PMSCs is contained in the recently signed International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Service Providers, where the companies committed themselves 
to ensuring that they have sufficient financial capacity to meet all claims arising 
from their work.89 
 
4   LICENSING AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL MEASURES 
While it may be easy for states to simply agree on the promulgation of international 
standards, it is usually a big challenge to secure effective implementation of those 
standards. The recognition of the schism between standard-setting and 
implementation has spawned considerable debate on the viability of the 
international system as a whole, and questions are being asked as to whether treaty 
regimes are the best vehicles for resolving international problems. As a 
consequence of these concerns we now see a general shift from standard-setting to 
implementation in the promulgation of treaty regimes. More treaties are now 
creating implementation and monitoring bodies to ensure that state parties are 
assisted in achieving the objectives of the treaty. Also, treaties are flexibly drafted to 
take advantage of already existing regimes that bear some similarity to their 
purpose and have enforcement qualities in them. That is why, in the Preamble to the 
Draft Convention, recognition is given to existing international regimes that have a 
bearing on PMSCs. But perhaps much more poignant in this regard is the 
acknowledgement, and indeed affirmation, that PMSCs and their clients must 
observe the existing rules of international law.  
 The Draft Convention envisages a two-level oversight system for PMSCs. The first 
is the domestic level. Obviously, states are crucial because they have a better 
organised system for promulgation of rules and enforcement thereof. The 
Convention demands that states take measures to ensure that PMSCs respect and 
observe human rights and that their conduct is consistent with international 
humanitarian law.90 At the second level the Convention establishes international 
oversight mechanisms that operate along the same lines as other UN treaty bodies. 
The two levels are linked through the principles of complementarity and 
subsidiarity as known in international law. 
 
                                               
88  Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, as amended, IT/32/ Rules 105 & 106. 
89  See International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (fn 10 above), para 69.  
90  Arts 5 (1) and 7. 




4.1 At the domestic Level 
It is common knowledge that protection against the violation of human rights by 
PMSCs cannot be achieved unless appropriate national and international legislation 
is adopted and implementation mechanisms are developed so as to ensure 
enforcement. One important thing that the Draft Convention does is to place 
responsibility for any military or security activity of PMSCs on the state in whose 
jurisdiction that PMSC is operating, whether or not that state has contracted the 
company.91 This means that states must take measures to ensure that PMSCs do not 
violate the law. One way of achieving this objective is by establishing an effective 
monitoring and oversight regime. The Draft Convention envisages a three-pronged 
approach that involves legislative intervention, institution-building and a 
procedural framework. States must, as a prerequisite, enact a “comprehensive 
domestic regime of regulation and oversight over activities in its territory of private 
military and security companies and their personnel”.92 This will enable the state to 
create a body responsible for monitoring and oversight. The body created will be 
tasked with implementing a national registration and licensing procedure for 
PMSCs. 
 
4.1.1  National institutions for monitoring and oversight 
The Draft Convention enjoins each state to create a governmental body that would 
act as “national centre for collection, analysis and exchange of information” on 
activities of PMSCs.93 It does not indicate the kinds of structures that such a body 
should have. Presumably this leaves state parties with latitude in modelling such 
institutions to fit their particular circumstances. We have seen a variety of national 
institutions created to promote international standards. The examples that readily 
come to mind are national human rights organisations.94 This idea is therefore not 
unique. What might be unique is its application to PMSCs. In the past, states have 
attempted to meet the objectives of regional and international mercenary law by 
establishing regimes prohibiting their citizens from participating in mercenary 
                                               
91  Art 4(2). 
92  Art 13. 
93  Art 13(1)(b). 
94  See McQuoid-Mason D  “The Role of Human Rights Institutions in South Africa” in Hossain K et al 
(eds) Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Offices (2000) 618; Okafor O & S Agbakwa  “On 
Legalism, Popular Agency and “Voices of Suffering”: The Nigerian National Human Rights 
Commission in Context” (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 662; Reif L “Building Democratic 
Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human 
Rights Protection” (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1. 
PRIVATISATION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY 
 
 21 
activities abroad and imposing stringent licensing requirements for any security or 
military involvement of their citizens abroad.  
 In South Africa, for example, the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Act 2006, 
which is the primary legislation dealing with private military and related services, 
did not create any regulatory governmental body. Instead, it placed all licensing 
responsibilities on the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) 
established under the National Conventional Arms Control Act of 2002. The NCACC 
was established as an arms control mechanism with its capacity geared towards the 
management of arms licensing processes. It could not be expected to fulfil the 
broader security concerns that the PMSC industry portends. Thus, the NCACC is a far 
cry from what article 13 of the Draft Convention envisages.  
 The Sierra Leonean experience has been different. Having recovered from a long 
period of instability, the security sector reform agenda has been more focussed and 
relatively in tandem with current security concerns. Indeed, the legislative scheme 
with regard to security is perhaps closer to the requirements under the Draft 
Convention than can be said of any other country in Africa. The overarching 
legislation for security governance is the National Security and Central Intelligence 
Act passed in 2002.95 The Act created the Office of National Security (ONS) as the 
central organ for regulation of all private security operatives.96 It is this organ that 
licenses all PMSCs in accordance with set regulations and ensures that PMSCs 
comply with the Standard Operating Manual for Private Security Companies (SOP) 
that was promulgated in 2006.97 A recent estimate places the number of PMSCs that 
have been licensed by ONS at 30, although there may be more than 50 operating in 
Sierra Leone.98  The Sierra Leonean experience demonstrates that the requirements 
of article 13 of the Draft Convention can be achieved and that states could tailor 
their institutional arrangements to match their particular circumstances. 
 
4.1.2  Registration and licensing 
                                               
95  Other bodies that the Act establishes are the National Security Council (NSC) (chaired by the 
President), Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Force (RSLAF). See 
Conteh K “Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone and the Role of the Office of the National 
Security” in P Jackson  & P Albretch (eds) Issues and Themes of Sierra Leone Security System 
Transformation Process 1997-2007 (2008) 9. 
96  Note, however, that apart from its other functions the ONS acts as the secretariat of the NSC. 
97  SOP contains guidelines that must be fulfilled before licences can be issued. Such guidelines 
include minimum wage requirements for personnel, ownership of sufficient and up-to-date 
equipment, training of personnel in international humanitarian law, human and civil rights, and 
gender based violence (SOP.5). It also contains guidelines on complaint procedures, especially 
those that are labour related.  
98  See Ralby I “Regulating private security in Sierra Leone” (2010) 5(4) PeaceOps: Journal of 
International Peace Operations available at http://web.peaceops.com/archives/153 (accessed 2 
November 2010).   
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Apart from establishing a national body, the Draft Convention requires that state 
parties establish a legislative scheme that will set procedures for registration and 
licensing of PMSCs by government, specific requirements for training and 
experience of their personnel, and also mechanisms for monitoring offshore 
activities of registered contractors. Much has been said that touches on the issue of 
licensing. However, it should be mentioned that registration and licensing is 
perhaps the most effective way of monitoring PMSC activities within the domestic 
setting. The licensing regime established by the Draft Convention extends beyond 
the mere authorisation of PMSCs to do business in the territory of a state party. The 
process must ensure that PMSCs’ record of human rights violations and other 
violations of international law are examined and that due diligence standards are 
met. Secondly, licensing procedures are also required to be set up in home countries 
of PMSCs hoping to export their services abroad. Thus article 15 enjoins states to 
ensure that the export of military and security services occurs in compliance with 
appropriate licensing procedures. In addition, the Draft Convention requires that 
home as well as host states share information regarding PMSCs. 
 
4.2 International Oversight and Monitoring 
In the same spirit, the Draft Convention in article 29 proposes the establishment of a 
Committee on Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military Companies. 
The committee will add to the list of other UN treaty bodies that have been 
established along the same lines, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD);99 the Human Rights Committee (HRC) established under the 
ICCPR;100 the Committee against Torture (CAT);101 the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW);102 and the Committee on Protection of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW).103 The composition of 
the committee is still up for debate. The initial suggestion was that the Committee 
should have 14 members elected by state parties, who would serve in their personal 
capacities for a term of four years. In electing the members states will have due 
regard to their moral standing, impartiality and recognised competence in the fields 
covered by the Convention as well as geographical distribution.104 The committee 
shall perform four main functions, namely examination of reports, interpretation of 
                                               
99  Established under art 8 of ICERD. The Committee has competence to consider individual 
complaints against the state provided the state has accepted its competence (art 14).  
100  The Committee is established under art 28 of ICCPR. See the Optional Protocol to ICCPR for the 
Committee’s competence to entertain individual complaints against the state. 
101  See art 17 of Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. 
102  See art 17 of CEDAW. 
103  The Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families, GA Res 45/158, adopted on 18 December 1990. 
104  Art 29(1) 
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the Convention, information gathering, dispute resolution and consideration of 




4.2.1  The system of periodic reporting 
The reporting obligations are set out in article 31. Each state party is required to 
submit a report detailing the “legislative, judicial, administrative and other 
measures” it has taken to give effect to the Convention. The general wording of this 
article, particularly the reference to “other measures”, is clearly meant to give states 
greater freedom in deciding what to include in the report. This might be particularly 
useful because, whereas the object is to report on compliance with the Convention, 
states might wish to include other legislative measures relating to human rights 
protection or international humanitarian law generally that may have an indirect 
bearing on PMSC activity.  
 Three types of reports are envisaged by the Convention. The first is what could be 
referred to as “initial reports” which must be filed within a set period after the state 
ratifies the Convention and thereby assumes its obligations.  The second is periodic 
reports, which must be submitted periodically as the Convention decrees. Lastly, 
supplementary reports are to be submitted on request of the Committee. The 
Convention does not set guidelines as to the content of the reports. This is left to the 
committee. The experience of other UN treaty bodies is that such guidelines may 
help ensure the uniformity of reports and thus enable the recipient body to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of the situation in each state with regard to the 
implementation of the treaty.105  
 The committee must reserve the right to request further information in the form 
of supplementary reports. The tendency by some states may be to undermine the 
work of the Committee by supplying reports that claim wholesale compliance with 
the Convention or are simply too brief or inadequate. In this regard, the committee 
may invoke the powers under article 31(1) (b) of the Draft Convention to request 
further reports. The need for periodic reports is to maintain a dialogue between 
states and the committee on the steps they are taking to meet the objectives of the 
Convention. It is necessary therefore that the period set should be realistic, taking 
into account capacity issues since the reporting will need to be considered and 
helpful feedback rendered.   
                                               
105  See, for example, General Guidelines Regarding the form and Content of Reports from States 
Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant (Doc CCPR/C/5; Doc. A/32/44, Apx. IV) adopted by the 
Human Rights Committee at its 44th meeting, 29 August 1977. See also Bayefsky A “Human Rights 
and Direct participation: Direct participation in the UN Human Rights System” Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law Vol. 95 (2001) 71. 
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 The reporting system has certain inherent weaknesses that are unlikely to be 
overcome by the Draft Convention in its present form. First, there is really no way of 
compelling states to submit reports. Article 32(2) of the Draft Convention provides 
that, if a report is due for three months, the Committee may notify the state party “of 
the need to examine the implementation of the Convention in that state party on the 
basis of any reliable information” that the committee may have received. As 
experience in other treaty bodies have shown, these reports are extremely valuable 
to practitioners and researchers because they document state response to activities 
within its territory.106 For this reason, the submission of reports is crucial to 
attaining the objectives of the Convention.107 Apart from notification and polite aide-
mémoires, the committee should perhaps be allowed to publicise the list of 
defaulting states.  
 Secondly, the Convention is silent on procedure to be adopted in examining 
reports. There is no requirement that representatives of states should be present 
during the examination of their countries’ reports to answer questions or that 
accredited organisations be allowed to participate in the proceedings. One way in 
which to ensure quality of the reports submitted to the committee is to allow for 
broader participation in the examination process. It is usually NGOs and other civil 
society groups on the ground that would know if the reports are not entirely 
accurate. Thirdly, the “observations and recommendations” of the committee should 
be put to more effective use. The Draft Convention merely provides that the 
Committee will consider the report and thereafter make “observations and 
recommendations” to be transmitted to the state party.108 Perhaps the Convention 
should allow the Committee more liberty to publicise their recommendations and 
publicly demand action from states. In this way the reporting process could have 
more teeth and also be consistent with the overall purpose of the Draft Convention.   
 In the same spirit, the Draft Convention should have provided for submissions of 
“alternative reports” by civil society groups. Alternative reports are more likely to 
provide a critical perspective on activities of PMSCs than official ones. What is 
commendable, however, is that the committee is mandated to engage with other 
agencies and bodies towards soliciting assistance for state parties who have 
demonstrated need.109   
 
4.2.2 Dispute resolution  
                                               
106  See McGoldrick D The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1994) 63. 
107  Other treaty bodies have had to deal with this problem. For example, in 2006 the Human Rights 
Committee noted that Gambia had not submitted its reports for 21 years, Equatorial Guinea for 17 
years, Somali and Nicaragua for 15 years, Bulgaria and Iran for 11 years, Jordan for 9 and Spain 
for 7 years. See Annual Report 2006 UN Doc A/61/40 (2005) Par 70-72. 
108  Art 32. 
109  Art 32(7). 
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The Committee handles disputes between state parties in relation to matters 
covered by the Convention. The dispute resolution function occurs at two levels. The 
first is what the Convention refers to as the “inquiry procedure” in article 33. Acting 
on information received about “grave or systematic violations” of the Convention, 
the Committee shall invite the state parties in whose territory the offences have 
occurred to “cooperate in the examination of the information” and submit 
observations.110 The committee together with states concerned will examine the 
information and, with agreement of parties, conduct a visit in loco.111 The findings of 
the committee together with its recommendations shall be communicated to the 
state(s) concerned. The whole process shall remain confidential.  
 This, however, is not unique. Under CEDAW a confidential enquiry may be 
undertaken if the committee receives reliable information indicating “grave or 
systematic” violations in the territory of a state party.112 It should be noted that, 
within the human rights field, an investigative fact-finding may be undertaken only 
in circumstances where the violations are grave or systematic, meaning that it 
should be more than just one incident. In the Draft Convention the language of 
“systematic or grave” violation has been used, not in relation to human rights or 
international humanitarian law violations, but in relation to “the provisions set forth 
in the Convention”. The impression created, therefore, is that the Committee may 
undertake fact-finding if there is persistent neglect or refusal by a state party to 
impose licensing or other regulatory measures on PMSCs operating on its territory 
or if a state party declines to prosecute officials of a PMSC in line with the criminal 
law regime created by the Convention. In this regard it should be pointed out that 
the complementarity principle alluded to in article 38 of the Draft Convention could 
be instructive, and the Committee may be at liberty to defer its jurisdiction to other 
competent UN bodies.  
 The second level of dispute resolution involves complaints against parties as set 
out in article 34 of the Draft Convention. Here, two things are important. First, a 
state must recognise the competence of the Committee before complaints can be 
entertained or findings be made against it in relation to activities of PMSCs in their 
territory. Secondly, complaints will only be admissible based on the exhaustion-of-
remedy rule and the generally recognised principles of international law.113 The 
procedure is similar to the enquiry process. The committee will receive complaints 
from members that consider other parties to have violated the provisions of the 
Convention. Subsequently, the complaint will be communicated to the party 
concerned which shall have the opportunity to respond. If the matter is not resolved 
through negotiations, the procedure under article 35 kicks in. The Committee shall 
                                               
110  Art 33. 
111  Contrast this with article 20 of CAT which mandates the CAT Committee to conduct an enquiry, 
including an on-site visit if it receives “reliable information” that torture is being practiced 
“systematically” in the territory of a state party to the Convention.   
112  Art 8, Optional Protocol to CEDAW, adopted 1999. 
113  Art 34(1)(b). 
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then appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission comprising five members to 
facilitate an amicable solution or to make a finding on the dispute.114 The report of 
the Commission shall be communicated to the parties involved before being shared 
with all other state parties to the Convention.115  
 
4.2.3  Individual/group complaint mechanism 
A complex system of individual petition by victims of violation of the Draft 
Convention is created by article 37. A declaration of recognition of competence of 
the Committee must be made by state parties before this procedure can be invoked 
by their nationals.116 The Convention sets very stringent admissibility requirements 
that mirror other complaint systems, especially regional human rights systems. 
Under article 37(2) the communication must be anonymous; the violations 
complained of must not be investigated by another system or body; and all effective 
remedies must have been exhausted. A communication that meets the admissibility 
test is sent to the state party concerned for comments. On receipt of the comments, 
the Committee then examines the communication behind closed doors and 
thereafter communicate its findings to the state concerned and to the author of the 
communication.117 The committee may request state parties to consider taking 
interim measures before it examines the merits of the communication.118  
 A few general comments should be made before concluding this section. Firstly, 
there seems to be some lingering concerns that, unless the draft law puts together 
an improved system of handling individual complaints, the Working group shall 
have squandered a real chance to improve on the work of the UN treaty bodies. 
Undoubtedly, the Draft Convention should have been an innovative instrument 
embodying the wealth of knowledge accumulated from the experiences of older 
bodies such as the Human Rights Committee. Instead it is a dogmatic piece that 
seeks to balance interests rather than harness the power of the international 
community towards dealing with the PMSC problematique.  
 This leads to my second observation; that is, that the draft Convention should 
have built on the same experiences to broaden its regulatory reach rather than 
restrict it. One could take the example of the perennial problem of treaty bodies 
                                               
114  Art 35(1). 
115  Art 39. 
116  In the earlier draft of the Convention, state parties wishing to recognise the competence of the 
Committee to receive such petition from their nationals had to make a declaration in this regard 
and then establish a national body that would be competent to consider such petitions. 
Individuals could only go to the Committee after they had failed to obtain “satisfaction” from the 
national body. This has been replaced by a more expedient procedure which is similar to other 
procedures of other individual complaint mechanisms. 
117  Most treaty bodies deal with communications behind closed doors. The ECOSOC 1503 procedure, 
which is meant to deal with complaints related to systematic and gross human rights violations of 
human rights, is held in private.  
118  Art 37(4). 
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failing to produce remedies.119 The Draft Convention could have adopted the 
European approach where decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and 
recommendations of Ministers under the ECHR are legally binding on states.120 The 
argument could have been that, since the thrust of the Draft Convention’s regulatory 
mandate is directed towards ensuring that corporate security entities observe the 
law, compliance with its regime should have some coercive force. After all, states 
have the latitude of imposing a compliance regime on PMSCs working within their 
territories that would ultimately absolve them from liability. Notwithstanding the 
above there is no excuse for not ensuring adequate capacity in the handling of 
reports and complaints, increasing media visibility for Committee decisions, or 
creating a viable nexus between the working of the Committee and other UN organs, 
regional bodies, NGOs and intra-governmental organisations, so that violations are 
reported in a timely manner and sanctioned through more than just one avenue.  
   
5   CONCLUSION 
The regulatory framework created by the Draft Convention is undoubtedly pitched 
at the ideology of free market as it accepts privatisation in the industry and affirms 
the distinction between legitimate private security operators and mercenaries. If its 
promise were to be judged on this score alone, its relevance to poorer nations could 
be contestable because these nations have, after all, not benefited much from neo-
liberalism. In my view, its promise is founded on its attempt to establish a hybrid 
regulatory framework that combines the essence of non-public approaches to 
security with public-oriented sanctions against undesirable conduct.  Ironically, this 
may also be the reason, perhaps, that its regime may appear to be overly ambitious.  
But, to a large measure, this is also its strength. In the same way that its creation of 
“restrictive” universal standards for PMSCs may be seen as inimical to ideals of the 
free market,121 its recognition of the capacity of private entities to enter into 
legitimate contracts with states and international organisations will be applauded. 
                                               
119 See for example, O’Flaherty M “Reform of the UN human rights treaty body System: Locating the 
Dublin Statement” (2010) 10 (2) Human Rights Law Review 319. 
120 See European Convention on Human Rights, art 53. See also Zwaak L “The effects of the final 
decision of the supervisory organs under the European Convention on Human Rights” in Bayefsky 
A (ed) The UN Treaty System in the 21st Century (2000) 255. 
121 This ideology is captured succinctly by the world trade regime established by the Marrakesh 
Treaty of 1994 which created the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The work of WTO is 
described in the Preamble to the agreement as leading to the “raising of standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income … while 
allowing for the optimal use of the  world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance 
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with [its members’] respective needs and concerns 
at different levels of economic development” (emphasis added). See Wouters J & B. de Meester 
The World Trade Organization: A Legal and Institutional Analysis (2007) 13. See also Agarwal M 
“Issues of coherence in world trading system: A perspective from developing countries” (2006) 
43 (2) International Studies 203. 
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 It also lays emphasis on the protection of human rights and observance of 
international humanitarian law and clarifies aspects of rules of international 
customary law, such as those relating to state responsibility. This undoubtedly 
places its regulatory framework within the body of established international norms, 
thereby broadening the base for state participation in international law and 
eliminating the chances that states will pick and choose which international regimes 
to abide by when dealing with PMSCs. Be that as it may, the success of the Draft 
Convention will ultimately depend on how its structures balance public security 
objectives with global economic, political and social trends. Its framework may not 
be perfect and, indeed, many of its provisions will still need to be refined, but the 
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